determ ine rU$On5 lor their application (knowl n g-""hy~ As SUCh. I his expflcalion of epistemologic al foundations of educaliona! administratio n reiects tM noliOn lhal II\8.e is a theory·practic e dilemma io Iha lIeld. Instead . il suggest s thai Ihl!Ory and practice. esp-eeial ly In the preparation pr<> gram, need 10 be viewed as reciprocal . In epislemologlc a! terms lhat mean, Ihal knowing-thll (facll ar>d knowing-/>ow (skill) afl(f A}laled in lerms of knowing why (deve lopingl prQ'lld ing a rationa le for action1-
Prel,ca
Many 01 uS e~gaged in the ph ilo&Ophy 01 educ,Ho n have t>ee n merged Ithrown?1 inlO departmen ls of otduc. tional adminislra\ion and policy studieS. Alter the inilla! po. liIicking has diminishe<l and some degree 01 rappOrt has been eSla\>fi 8hotd we pofl(fer what role our lIe ld nasln re 13· t ion to such a practical one as ed~caiion sl admi n i~tr~tion.
My e, pe~ence has been ttlal phllolophy Of education c~ play, vilal role in a,pllca"ng and e.p!OJldlng tile ralher Ihto knowledge b,s.tr 01 suc~ ad mlnlSI ralive studles_ This pape r app li es Ryle·, facl -skill disti nction 10 edu cational adm i nisIralron and develops lne (sometimes flirled·with) cat~ory 01 ~nowir>g·why as an epistemologic al buls lor relating .theory 10 practice to. a field whic~ has Iypical ly dichotomozed 10 two.
I nl roduction
Anothe r W/lf to put the iss~e Is In term, of tM need tor the j\Ojministrator in trelninll to acquire knowledge aboul the Plactica in the protanion. 10 acquire sllilis that reille to day.lQ-day demands In "'minisl rlll .... p<acllce and the abilily to bri ng logelher suc h know lotdge afl(f skil ls in pracllcal ap pllulion. ne problem .elate! to the three components 01 adminisl rallve preparalion: knowle<lge JoCquisillon. skill acqul$ilion and praclical application.
To lo rm ulate Ihe problem In ep iSlem olog ica l lerms is 10 as k: what dO administrator s need 10 know. how should they know 11 ar>d why. In Orller 10get at such epistemologic al issues. Ihis anafysi~ will locos on Ih ..... elemenlS of knowl· edge relevant to tM fi eld of otducal io na l admlnl 8lfation: kno""lng·thal (Iactual knowledge), knowi ng-how lperlorma· live knowledoe or 5I<ill), and knowing-why (synl hetic knowledge or Ille abolily to develop ret Ion ales fO' acllonl· It Is not Inle nded IMllh is analysis ""i ll sp-ee ify a co rricul um, although some curricu lar Implications may ~ implicit . InSiead. whal i. inteJ'lded Is a display ot Ihe kInd 01 epistemologic al compelencies needed In 1M field In lerms 01 Mowlooge acqu is illon, ski ll lCq U isillon and practical arr pl ication th rough c l inlc,l experience.
Additionally, and by way of Inlroduclion, It can be noled thai moSI education'" adminiSlfliion " "'ning prog.ams in one way Of anolher already lrea! such m.llers. Elut il is d o~blf u l that they do &0 with a c lear ep istemo logi ca l basi • .
Many, driven by state cerlificatlon stand~rlIs, provide Inslruction in such spaelflc _ IS tacilltles. finance, slall developmMt, org anlzalional thl!Ory and I)eMvior ,..I\ho ul a clear know lotdge base 10 unily what Is learned. In Ollfect . admlnlstralors acquire knowledge and leilfn ~ set 01 skills In separated .. eu wilt>OUt an imegrated .islon ot hOW knowt· edge and "~ills Can ar>d sh ould I)e i~t~ratotd 10 achl&ve effectlv~ practlcsl appl icallon.
Th is analysis 1' 1111 .... isil tha epistemologic al distinction made by Gilberl Ayla in hiS (;(m~loI fheMrndl l 949) between knOwing·I MI Ilactoal ~nowIOOQ8) and knowing. ho"" (pe rlormal iye knowledge or skill). Ry le's thl!Ory of knowlooge has lhe advanlage 01 expand ing trad itional OlpiS· lemology to ifIClude &kill or whal mighl be c"'led pef0flTl8' l ive knowledoe. "s , ucn.11 maye_plical" Imponant dimen- determ ine rU$On5 lor their application (knowl n g-""hy~ As SUCh. I his expflcalion of epistemologic al foundations of educaliona! administratio n reiects tM noliOn lhal II\8.e is a theory·practic e dilemma io Iha lIeld. Instead . il suggest s thai Ihl!Ory and practice. esp-eeial ly In the preparation pr<> gram, need 10 be viewed as reciprocal . In epislemologlc a! terms lhat mean, Ihal knowing-thll (facll ar>d knowing-/>ow (skill) afl(f A}laled in lerms of knowing why (deve lopingl prQ'lld ing a rationa le for action1-Prel,ca Many 01 uS e~gaged in the ph ilo&Ophy 01 educ,Ho n have t>ee n merged Ithrown?1 inlO departmen ls of otduc. tional adminislra\ion and policy studieS. Alter the inilla! po. liIicking has diminishe<l and some degree 01 rappOrt has been eSla\>fi 8hotd we pofl(fer what role our lIe ld nasln re 13· t ion to such a practical one as ed~caiion sl admi n i~tr~tion.
Th is analysis 1' 1111 .... isil tha epistemologic al distinction made by Gilberl Ayla in hiS (;(m~loI fheMrndl l 949) between knOwing·I MI Ilactoal ~nowIOOQ8) and knowing. ho"" (pe rlormal iye knowledge or skill). Ry le's thl!Ory of knowlooge has lhe advanlage 01 expand ing trad itional OlpiS· lemology to ifIClude &kill or whal mighl be c"'led pef0flTl8' l ive knowledoe. "s , ucn.11 maye_plical" Imponant dimen-s ions of a knowledge base for such pract ica l f ields as educat ional ad min ist rat ion, Background to Gilb ert Ryl e'$ Di $l incfion Discuss ions and arg ume nts over the nat ure of know l· edge have dom ina1ed t he Western phHosophi c t radit io n, Broadly . iewed, philosop hers have looked at know ledge from two perspecti.es: t he specu lat ive temper and t he analyt ic te mper_ Plato . iewed t he acq uisitio n of know ledg€ o r learning as an acf of re meml>eri ng w hat 1he mi nd innately he ld_ That is the central argum ent in t he dialogue of the Meno. But t he grounds of t hat posWon is most clearly set forth in the Republic where Plato to ld the Myl h of Er. Er, a so ldier, seemed to ha.e b-een slain in batt le and his &Cu i t ransce nd€d t o a rea lm of eve rlasting truth, But Er did not die and so wh€n he recove red he was able to recount what he experienced, Souls in the rea lm of everlasting reality 00· fore they were reborn camped beside the ba nks of t he For· getfu l River. Those who dra nk a ~reat Mal wou ld reme ml>e r not hing of t he t ruth t hey experienced. Those who dran k less may recall, w it h hell' on earth, something of the truth (So ltis & Phi lli ps, t 985)_ Thus Plato's fIOt ion of innate ideas as t he bas is 01 kflOwledge was born, But t he Myth has a qual ity of fant asy and thus one can readHy see its esse ntia ll y specu la· Ii.e characte r.
In a less spec ul at i.e man ner, Aristot le pro. ided an analysis whi ch focused on one area of th e anc ient Tri. ium, rheto ri c_ From Aristotle we can der i.e an ax iom' if you can say it, t hen you know it. As Joh n Helman Randall {' 960) has noted' Knowl edge iS, li ke language , systemati~ and logical , . _ We can be said to "know" a th in g only when we can state in precise language w hat t hat th ing is, and wh y it is as it is. {po 7) Late r the Britis h empiricists, especia lly Loc ke and Hume, emphaSized se nso ry imp ression or sense data as the basis lor what is known, R.-.inlo rced by the log ical poSit ivists in t his cen tu ry, t h~ ~mp ir ical movement came to . iew knowledge as just if ied t rue be li ef. On~ of the most art iculat e statements of t his view is t hat of A ,J. Ayer (H)56) who argued:
The ne cessary and s uff ic ient conditio ns lo r know ino t hat somet hing is t he case are f irst t hat what one said is known to 00 t rue, sec ond ly t hat one be sure of it , and thirdly that one have t he ri ght to be sure, (I'. 35) Ayer (1956) expanded the comment ary on his three criteria:
Whe n we claim the right to be su re of any gi.e n st atement, t he bas is of the ctai m may be either that t he state ment is se l f-e. idem, or th at its t rut h is d irect ly warranled by our experience, or t hat it is .alid ly derivab le from some ot her statemen1, or set of state ments, of wh ich we have the ri ght to t>e sure, (p, 40)
At bottom , Ayer's theo ry Is rad icall y emplric lstic_ But th e s ignif icant facto r to hig h light he re i$ that knowl edge is co nst rued as propos itional To put Ayer's positio n in ax iomat ic t.-.rms, know led(je is that which can be demonS! rated or j us· tif ied in logicaf , emp irical terms. John Wisdo m (1957) has st ated it very neatl y: "The mean ing of a stat emen t is t he method 01 its verifi cation" (p. 51). In ot her words, meaning can 00 est ab li shed when a propos ition can be t ranslated into ot her st ateme nt s or senten ces which refer to an experi· ence which is loo ica ily poss ible and, typ ically, empiricall y verified, Once th€ trans lati on is made no ot her €xp lanation is nece ssary. Note t h€ mo.ement of tho ught from spec ulat ion to analysis, For Plato ~n ow l edge was th e re membranc e of innate ideas wh ic h he supported by specu lat i.e reaso ning, not emp irical 9rou ndi ng_ Recall what Aristot le was claimIng: If you ca n say it, t hen you know it That is, ~n ow l edge is essent ially proposi1 10nal. Or co nsider again 1he British empiricist s_If know ledge is based on sensory date, the n it can be stated in proposit ional form as empiricall y 9rou nded da1a, so Locke and Hume and Aye r l>e lieved A great deal of learn ing In ed ucal ional adm inistrat ion proceeds in 1his ma nner of propos it iona lly represented knowledge, Appropriately so. But the learn ing of adm inis_ t rat i>e prax is, I wou ld argue, goes l>eyond learn ing proposit ional kn ow led(je. It inc l udes the skil f 01 putti ng toge1her a wide range of propos itio nal learn ings and internali <lng op· erat io nal bellavio rs that ca n be called upon at a mome nt 's notice and deployed in real s itu ations . Phi losophy's i n· si ste nce on ep istemolog ical acc uracy t hrough empirical tests is not incorrect , but it wi ll be aroued he r€ that it is incomp lete, Ryle on Knowing_1hat and Knowing .hOw Gi lbert Ryle saw t he incomplete ness of trad itiona l ep ist emo logies when he made his sem ina l dist inction abo ut know ledge types, cont rasting knowing -that or fact ua l know ledge and knowing-how or pe rformati .e know ledgel sk ill.
Knowing-that and know i n~-h o w in Ry le's view are dis· tinctive forms of kn ow ledge. Kn ow in o-how to sw im is not dependant on any art iculate ve rbal ab i lit ies. A nd th e art iculate .e rbal izalion of requ isites for sw im ming are not necessa rily rel ated to t he act of sw im mi ng_ As Jo nas So lt is (' 978) com menlS:
if one knows how to sw im ___ thi s does not impty or, indeed, necess itate t hat one have any verbal know ledge abo ut sw im mi ng_ And, alternale ly, acquir ing ver· bal kn ow ledge about swi mm ing does not imp ly t hat one wil l then b-e abfe to sw im, (P, 40) In sum, Ry le Clearl y aroued that t hese we re t wo dilferen1 and d ist ingu ishable ways of knowing_ In terms of edu~a · tio nal adm inist ration , One wo uld arg ue that a superin tend· ent's ski ll in relat ing to va rious po lit ica l constit uenc ies may be enhanc~d by academ ic prepa rat io n in t he areas of orga· nizat iona l t heory and organizational behav ior (knowing' t hat), At t he same t im e, exposu re to act ual ci rcu mst ances invo lvinQ such matters as scllool comm unit y relations and board -supe ri ntende nt interacti on provides a co nt rast ing ki nd of know ledge (k now ing-how). This, in turn, ra is€s t he Questi on for th e preparat ion program of how these d ist inctive know ledge types are, o r can 00, integrat ed But Ry le's disti nctio n was not unchall enged, John Hartland -Swann (' 956) argued t hat Ry le's analys is disti nguishing knowi ng-t hat fro m knowing -h ow could 00 co llapsed, He poS ited that know ing-t hat cou ld be reduced to know ing-how_ For e'ample, if one knew t hat parrots are birds or t hat George Washi ngton was t he f irst Pres ident of the Un ited St ates, such proposit ions were t he prod uct of know i ng-how to anSWer such questions {pp . t t t -t t 5)_ Jane Ro land Marti n granled Hartland-Swan n's conc l u· sion o n logical gro unds (i.e . all know ing is in some sense pe rformat i>e), bul sti ll held to Ryle's dist inct ion between know ing-t hat and knowing·how. She reasoned that some pe rfo rmances requi re more practice t ha n ot hers, Fo r exam · pie, Sw im ming requ ired practice far in excess of the utte r' anCe of a sim pie proposit ion, such as, "George Washington waS the lirst pres id€nt of t he Un ited St ates," Acco rdingly, Mart in argued t hat Ryle's dist inct ion was uselu l because accordi n~ to her pract ice criterio n t he two pe rformances were epistemol og ica lly d isti ngu ishab le_ But , in the cou rse of Martin's (' 961) analys is, as we ll as affirm in g t he di sti nc ti on betwee n k now in g-t hat and knowi ng-how, she suggested t hat 01her forms of knowledge While classmom. ""-' adeQulte klr lhe I.,amin g of 1M· Of)' and Ihe Inil ial leam l ng of I kil i. there i. no substitute !or the field site for th e app llCai ion all he th&Ory and ski II prev l· ously learned in Isolat ion from actual prac tice . 50 viewed . th e fie ld site beco mes an Impo rlent ele men! In the tra ining program for developlnll Ihe Interre lallon bel ... "" n Ihea,), ."d skill. Here. In Ihis ulimate. an Imporlanl Question I, ralud Is lhere acleqU31e time and OPPOJ'lunliV lor relleel ion IlDOullhe relallons-hip t>8lween I heory and skill? Are there adequaie instruments (e.g. semInars. field pracliea. menlO" Ships) 10 develop these relationShIpS and ptOVide explans· tloolof how lheory and sl<iIIlnfo,m one anolher? f thin k Ihat "I"ed North Whilehead (1914) captured Ihe importance of thl, interrelationship in lhe fOllowing remar1\;
Educational Considerations
What Ihe facu lty have te c~ltl.a te is act ivity in th e
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presence of knowledge. What Ihe sl"'-'enls " -10 learn is activity in l he P"$9f)(;9 of knowledge. This discussion releetl Ihe doclrine Ihat SIU, denlS should li~1 learn passively. fU1d then. !\awIng learned, should apply knowledge. 11 i$ a psychological error. In the pro<:eu of learnin g Ihere $/1ould be pm.., nt , in som e aense or Olher. a subordinate actlvlly of applicatio n. In fac11 ha appl icatio ns are pa rI of the knowled~e. Fo r th e very ~i1n i ng of Ih e things ~n own is wrapped up In their re lations hips i)eyond Ihemsel· ves. This unapplied knowledge Is knowled ge Shorn of il$ mefU1 lnlllpp. 218-2 19) Knowing· .... y
The contention lIe.e Is Ihat the interrniatiooahipi be-
